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5. Changes in Family unit Size over the...

• Changes in Family Size over the Generations in France (1850-1966)
• Suivre cet auteur Sandra Brée, Translated by Suivre cet auteur Madeleine Grieve
• In Population Volume 72, Issue 2, 2017, pages 297 to 332

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aneTo nautical chart fertility over a long period, demographers and historians have often used synthetic indicators such as completed fertility or total fertility rate. These indicators draw an average number of children per adult female for a cohort or a period of time, merely do not runway changes in family size. Has the percentage of childless women evolved over time? What is the share of families with 4 children? Through a meticulous comparison of the questions and data from eight population censuses and family surveys, Sandra Brée describes the changes in the family size of women born betwixt the 1850s and the 1960s, spanning more than a century of cohorts. She shows that large families began to decline in the belatedly nineteenth century, that levels of childlessness varied over the period, and that the share of families with 2 children began to increase with the cohorts born in the 1920s. This study highlights the benefits of associating indicators of mean fertility with measures of parity.

2The history of French fertility since the nineteenth century is at present well known. Still, the distribution of women's lifetime number of children, in other words, their family size or parity, is rarely mentioned. Fertility tends to be approached through the hateful number of children born to each adult female (completed fertility for cohorts, and total fertility rate for menses assay) and through historic period-specific fertility rates, only these averages are rarely broken downwardly to describe how many women had no children, one kid, 2 children, etc. An assay of averages conceals the specific trend of each family size. Is the reject in completed fertility atributable to the increasing rarity of large families or to a higher frequency of small families? And what is the impact of childlessness on completed fertility?

3Authors who have analysed the fertility of French cohorts over the long term (Daguet, 2002; Festy, 1979; INED, 1991; Sardon, 1990; Toulemon, 2001) have mainly worked with aggregate civil registration data (using the number of births as the numerator) and census results (using the number of women as the denominator). These aggregate data tin can be used to depict fertility trends, but not to make up one's mind the exact number of children born to women by the end of their reproductive lives. [1] However, as Patrick Festy stresses (1979, p. 96), "changes in family unit size are central to the explanation". Just Laurent Toulemon (1995, 2001) has used family surveys to estimate the fertility of the cohorts built-in effectually 1930 and to summate family sizes. Furthermore, these studies rarely distinguish betwixt ever-married and never-married women.

4Consequently, there is no comparative research on cohort fertility going back to the cohorts of the 1850s that uses a retrospective method and differentiates between the fertility of e'er-married women (including widows and divorcees) [ii] and that of women who were never-married at age 45. This article begins with a review of the available sources and data, and of the methods used to analyse the fertility of the cohorts born in France betwixt 1850 and 1965. It and then examines fertility changes over a long period based on family size and then on parity progression ratios. The simultaneous study of changes in family size and completed fertility improves our understanding of fertility trends and, more specifically, the bear upon of each family size on the pattern of overall fertility.

I – Sources and method used to measure family size

5The retrospective method for estimating fertility uses data on the reported number of children born to women anile 45 and over during their reproductive lives. Questions on the number of children have not e'er been asked in censuses in French republic or elsewhere (Eggerickx and Begeot, 1993); France is rather unique in that regard – the censuses of 1906, 1931 and 1946 all included the question "How many children have yous had?". [3] In 1931 and 1946, the question on family size was asked of married, widowed and divorced women and of widowed men (and of household heads in 1906). This data is valuable for analysing fertility. From 1954 onwards, the question was included in a separate "Family survey" (Enquête famille, also called Étude de fifty'histoire familiale in 1999 and Enquête famille et logements in 2011), as recommended by Louis Henry (1953). Henry suggested that detailed analysis of fertility should be based on "the entire history of the family [collected by means of] specific surveys" (Henry, 1953, pp. 489-490), simply that the question "How many children do you have?" should be kept in the five-yr population censuses to provide statistics on families receiving family allowances based on their number of dependent children.

i – What data are available?

6Since 1954, the question on the number of children born has been moved from the census to the Family unit surveys associated with the demography (Table one) that only cover a sample of the population. [iv] The outset family unit survey was conducted simultaneously with the census of 1954, and subsequent surveys were conducted with the censuses of 1962, 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999 and 2011 (Tabular array 1). In the offset iii surveys, the question was but asked of ever-married women. [5] In subsequent ones, it was asked of all women, irrespective of their marital status, and in the last 2 surveys it was also asked of men.

Tabular array 1

Characteristics of the Family surveys

Characteristics of the Family surveys

7Fertility estimates based on retrospective questions can be skewed past various biases due to call back errors (especially for the oldest women at the fourth dimension of the survey), pick effects due to deaths of children and their mother or to migration of mothers, and non-response. Analyses of French and Belgian data show that the risks of bias stemming from recall errors and selection effects are very low (Brée et al., 2016b), which confirms Neels' (2010) and Van Bavel'southward (2014) findings for Belgium, and those of Andersson and Sobolev (2013) for Sweden. Women's completed fertility calculated from censuses and surveys is consequent with completed fertility from civil registration data. Moreover, concordant results are obtained for the fertility of women from the same accomplice observed beyond unlike censuses or surveys. Survey information nevertheless appear to be less reliable than data from exhaustive censuses, particularly for analyses at regional level, where the numbers may be quite small (Brée et al., 2016b). [6]

8The trouble of non-response bias was raised by Paul Vincent as early as 1946. He identified two types of not-respondents to the question "How many live-built-in children have you had?", namely "careless" respondents, who merely forgot to reply the question (or who did not wish to, although he does non really consider that possibility), and respondents who thought that, by leaving the space blank, they were indicating "none". Afterwards analysing the non-responses, Vincent decided that the careless group accounted for only 3% of the total (in 1931) and assumed that the remaining 97% were childless. He distributed the first 3% of not-responses proportionately across the other family unit sizes. Louis Henry questioned this distribution method (Henry, 1953), but conceded that while the solution of considering all non-responders as childless was not quite satisfactory, it was doubtless impossible to do ameliorate. The researchers in accuse of family unit statistics derived from the 1946 census also considered that all the women who did non answer the question "How many live-built-in children accept you had?" were childless. While that may seem like a strong assumption, the differences between the 1931 and 1946 censuses are small (Figure 2). The level of total childlessness (all women) measured in this manner (26% in French republic) is consequent with that measured in other western countries: 32% for Belgium (Brée et al., 2017), 26% in Deutschland (Dorbritz and Schwartz, 1996), 23% in kingdom of the netherlands (Rowland, 2007), 24% in the United states of america (Morgan, 1991) and 31% in Australia (Rowland, 2007).

9In the Family surveys, although the not-response rates vary considerably from one survey to another [vii] (Brée et al., 2016b), consistent estimates are obtained for the different parities and for completed fertility by birth cohort.

ii – Measuring completed fertility and family size by women's marital condition

10Figure 1 shows estimates of completed fertility of women e'er-married past age 45 calculated from the censuses of 1931 and 1946 on the one hand, and from the surveys of 1954, 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999 and 2011 on the other. [8]

11The estimates based on the ii types of data source are highly consistent, with the exception of the concluding family survey (Famille et logements, 2011), which leads to much lower completed fertility than the 3 previous surveys (particularly 1999). There seems to have been an nether-reporting of children born before the current matrimony, in particular when those children were not living with the couple (Mazuy and Toulemon, 2013).

Figure i

Completed fertility of ever-married women by accomplice according to different sources (survey data smoothed over three years)

Completed fertility of e'er-married women past cohort according to different sources (survey data smoothed over three years)

Estimation: Average number of live-born children built-in per married, widowed or divorced woman in each cohort.

12But what if nosotros await more specifically at the parity distribution (Effigy 2)? With regard to childlessness among women who had been married at least once, the 1946 census is highly consistent with the data from the 1954 and 1975 surveys, and with the 1999 survey for the cohorts born afterward 1926. Compared with those data, the 1982, 1990 and 2011 surveys overestimate childlessness. The information from the unlike sources are concordant for the "1 child" and "two children" categories (except the data from the 1999 survey for the cohorts of women built-in before 1920 who reported having had two children). The data are slightly less homogeneous for women who reported having had three children, although they are still fairly consistent. Nevertheless, the 2011 survey underestimates the percentage of mothers of four or more children compared with the data from the other surveys.

13Based on these dissimilar sources, we estimated women's fertility using the weightings shown in Tabular array 2. The data from the censuses of 1931 and 1946 were used for the cohorts built-in before 1906. For the 1912-1916 cohort onwards, [nine] the family unit surveys were used, but not the 1999 and 2011 surveys for the oldest cohorts (aged over 75 at the time of those surveys) because the numbers were very depression (Appendix Figure A.1). We chose to use these simple estimates because they get in easier to distinguish between the fertility of ever-married women and never-married women while maintaining information consistency for all women. Moreover, these estimates tin be updated with data from future family surveys. Estimates of parity distribution and completed fertility are shown in Appendix Table A.1.

Effigy 2

Distribution of ever-married women at the time of the survey or census past family size (%) and by five-year cohort according to different data sources (data smoothed over three years)

Distribution of ever-married women at the time of the survey or demography by family size (%) and past five-yr cohort co-ordinate to dissimilar data sources (data smoothed over three years)

Interpretation: For each figure: proportion of ever-married women at the time of the survey who had x live-born children.

Table 2

Weightings used for the estimates based on censuses (C) and family surveys (S)

Weightings used for the estimates based on censuses (C) and family surveys (South)

14Regarding women never married at age 45, the 1982, 1990, 1999 and 2011 surveys yield consequent results on parities and completed fertility despite the small numbers (Appendix Figure A.2). For the cohorts born earlier 1915, the fertility of never-married women could not be measured directly. To estimate general fertility from the 1946 census (which does not provide data on never-married women), Festy calculated that never-married women contributed to full general fertility by 0.06 first births and 0.02 2d births, i.due east. a total of 0.08 births for completed fertility of 2 to 2.6 births for all women (Festy 1979; INED, 1966, 1991). This is equivalent to 3% to 4% of births exterior wedlock, a calculation consistent with Nizard and Maksud'south (1977) data on illegitimate births. Still, this means, for the 1891-1895 cohort for example, that 52% of women who were never married at age 45 were childless, that 32% had one kid and 16% had two children. The idea that almost half of the women who were never-married at historic period 45 had at least one child seems excessive, peculiarly given that, among women born in 1912-1916 (the showtime cohorts for which parities of never-married women are at levels consistent with those of subsequent cohorts), the 1999 survey found that 84% of never-married women were childless, 10% were mothers of one child and half dozen% mothers of ii children, i.e. just 16% of never-married women had at least one kid. We therefore decided to utilise these percentages for the earlier cohorts, at the risk of under-estimating slightly the contribution of never-married women to full general fertility if illegitimate births decreased over those cohorts. [10] These estimates of the fertility of women never-married at age 45 are therefore lower than Festy's, as is also the case, therefore, for my estimates of general fertility.

15The parity distribution of all women and their completed fertility is estimated using the following formula:

17where Px _thou = overall fertility at birth-order x

18Px _m = fertility at nativity-order x of women e'er-married at age 45

19Px _nm = fertility at birth-order x of women never-married at age 45

twentyC _p = Permanent celibacy [11]

21The estimates for the cohorts born from the 1920s onwards [12] are highly consistent with those based direct on the survey data (Appendix Effigy A.3). The estimates for the previous cohorts differ from those derived from the 1946 census since the data available in that census for all women assumed that all never-married women were childless (Appendix Figure A.4). They also differ from those that can exist derived from the information in Depoid (1941) or Festy (1979) based on a diagonal reading [13] of historic period-specific fertility rates (Appendix Effigy A.four). These estimates, for the cohorts born before 1890, are college than those based an supposition that all never-married women had at least one child, which is clearly improbable: either completed fertility calculated retrospectively underestimates fertility, or a diagonal reading of age-specific fertility overestimates information technology.

22Under the first hypothesis, it would hateful that the women who died or migrated had college fertility than the others. Even so, the women lost to observation generally had slightly lower fertility than the survivors (Andersson and Sobolev, 2013; Brée et al., 2016b). As suggested above, assuming that all of the women who did non respond were childless may besides exist excessive. It is too possible that when they answered the question at age 45 or more, some women may take omitted children who were born alive simply who died a few hours or a few days later on nascency. [14]

23Under the 2nd hypothesis, completed fertility could be overestimated by a diagonal reading "because the fragments of the history of the various cohorts represented past each of these rates in a given year depend on the past history of these same cohorts" (Sardon, 1990, p. 17).

24The fertility of never-married women and of all women born earlier 1890 probably falls somewhere betwixt Festy's estimates (probably overestimated) and ours (probably underestimated). This analysis of the sources and the various estimates derived from those sources suggests that the family size estimates for married women are the nearly robust, in particular for the oldest cohorts.

II – Changing family unit size in cohorts born between 1850 and 1966

ane – Trends in family size

Ever-married women

25Figure iii shows the tendency in family size and completed fertility of ever-married women in the cohorts born in French republic between 1850 and 1966. We tin run into that like fertility levels are not always the issue of the same parity components (Toulemon, 2001). The 1897-1901 and 1957-1961 cohorts showroom the same low completed fertility (two.22 children per woman), just for the earlier cohorts it tin be attributed mainly to loftier percentages of childless women (17%) and mothers of only one child (26%), whereas for the later cohorts information technology results from a predominance of two-children families (41%). [15]

26Five groups of cohorts emerge from Effigy 3. First, the cohorts born earlier 1890, for whom the ascendant model (more 25%) was large families of 4 or more than children, and whose share began falling steadily at the cease of the nineteenth century (De Luca-Barrusse, 2008); second, the cohorts born between 1891 and 1911 who had their children between the two Globe Wars and for whom the dominant model was one child; third, the cohorts built-in between 1912 and 1931 who had most of their children during the baby nail, among whom we come across an increase in the number of families of three or more children; quaternary, the 1932-1946 cohorts amongst whom the share of families of 4 or more children declined and the two-children family unit began to boss (more than xxx% of families); last, the cohorts built-in in and later on 1947, among whom we discover a general convergence of fertility behaviours (Daguet, 2002; Prioux, 2002) and a stability (Toulemon et al., 2008), which seems to persist to this day (Mazuy et al., 2013).

Figure 3

Parity distribution of ever-married women (at historic period 45) past cohort^*

Parity distribution of ever-married women (at age 45) by accomplice^*

* The mean age at childbirth was 28 years for the oldest cohorts, and 27 for the more recent cohorts (INSEE, population estimates and civil records). For ease of interpretation, an boilerplate age of 28 years was added to the nativity cohorts to give an idea of the reproductive menstruum.

27We thus detect a "cyclical" pattern, where each cohort seems to react to the previous ane past adopting the opposite behaviour. The daughters of the women who had large families (the cohorts born before 1890) themselves had fewer children (the cohorts of 1891-1911); in turn, their daughters had large families (1912-1931 cohorts), but their granddaughters returned to lower fertility (1932-1951 cohorts). However, the nigh contempo cohorts (1952-1966) seem to have maintained a steady model of fertility mainly characterized by a majority of two-children families, although information technology is also early to say whether this is a long-term tendency or not.

28The fertility decline at the stop of the nineteenth century has been interpreted equally a sign of the change in parent-child relationships when affection became central (Ariès, 1960, 1980) and the child became "precious" (Praz, 2005). Decision-making fertility enabled parents to invest, emotionally and financially, in the "quality" of their children (Modify, 1992; Becker, 1965; Caldwell, 1976). An assay of family sizes reveals that it is mainly large families (four or more children) that accept go less and less common: their share fell by more half betwixt the cohorts of 1850 and 1895. Anne-Marie Sohn (1996, p. 809) has called the 4th child a "threshold number", beyond which "parents decide to abort". However, the subtract in families of four or more children was not offset past an increment in three-children families but rather by an increase in the percentages of childless women and mothers of only 1 child amidst the women who had children in the inter-war period. In other words, the fertility reject that began with the cohorts born around 1850 has not been linear across all family unit sizes, with a progressive downsizing from 4 children to 3, and from three children to ii, and and then forth, just represents a shift from a government where more than one-tertiary of families had four or more children to a regime where large families accounted for fewer than one-fifth of the total.

29The interwar flow was highly specific considering it simultaneously represented the end of the start transition (or the beginning of the stabilization phase if nosotros view the post-war baby nail as simply an "accident"; Desplanques, 1988; Knibiehler, 1997) and a time of major socioeconomic change (the demographic, social and economic impact of the Showtime Earth War and the economic crisis of the 1930s). [16] Despite public policies to heave fertility through repressive measures [17] and incentives [18] aimed at rebuilding the population and making upward for the deficit in births, the women who had their children between 1920 and 1940 were among the least fertile of the twentieth century. There was clearly a mismatch between legislative action and behaviour (Cova, 1997), since these laws had no credible affect on the birth rate (McLaren, 1990). While the first kid was normally desired, subsequent births were often precluded: "maternal instinct" was frequently referred to in the joyful testimonies recorded past Rebreyend (2003, p. 214), simply much less and then for successive, closely-spaced pregnancies, with unwanted pregnancies being described as a trap. 1-child families seem to have been truly feature of the interwar menses (Brée et al., 2016a, 2017). Some researchers attribute the loftier prevalence of small families to the specific events of the period rather than to personal preference (Rowland, 2007). For others, the rise in childlessness and in the proportion of ane-child families indicates a growing acceptance of behaviours (especially existence married and voluntarily childless) that had been unthinkable earlier (Anderson, 1998; Morgan, 1991). These behaviours are sometimes described as pioneering precursors of future alter (Anderson, 1998; Van Bavel and Kok, 2010). It is difficult to fully embrace the reasons behind the depression fertility levels of the interwar period, although, in addition to the connected fertility decline linked to the end of the transition, most theories emphasize the aggravating effect of context (Brée et al., 2016a).

30How should we interpret the fertility upturn that began with the 1895 cohort (Festy, 1979)? The French baby boom was characterized by a decline in childlessness and 1-child families, a slight increment in ii-children families, only above all past a very sharp increase in the share of families of iii or more children. If we simulate a linear turn down in families of four or more than children between the cohorts of 1897 and 1937, instead of the observed increment, and proportionally redistribute the other family unit sizes, completed fertility levels off in accord with the theoretical model of the demographic transition (Appendix Figure A.v). This result supports the interpretation of the infant blast as a temporary deviation (Coleman, 2004) and establishes the interwar menses as the end of the demographic transition, or at least as the beginning of a long stage of stagnation of average fertility, because family sizes subsequently changed again. Demographers continue to argue nearly the factors that led the cohorts of simply children to have then many large families (Calot and Sardon, 1998; Van Bavel and Reher, 2013). The baby boom has been seen every bit a event of the optimism triggered by the end of the Second World State of war. However, fertility began to rising earlier the end of the war, then that hypothesis has been rejected (Calot and Sardon, 1998; Van Bavel and Reher, 2013). Economic explanations have also oftentimes been advanced but do not observe much empirical support (outside studies of the United states; Doliger, 2008). According to Van Bavel and Reher (2013), the baby boom tin can be attributed largely to a boom in marriage, a decrease in the mean age at marriage and a consequent subtract in the mean age at first nascency. Longer marriages and the use of still traditional ways of contraception (mainly coitus interruptus) led to an increment in family sizes. In the specific instance of France, according to Calot and Sardon (1998) and to Chesnais (2006), French republic'southward pro-family policies may also have created a "sense of urgency" to avert population refuse.

31In the cohorts born in the early 1930s, fertility fell again. In France the infant bust was characterized by an increase in families of two children and a decline in families of iv or more. The bust is ordinarily attributed to the contraceptive revolution (Westoff and Ryder, 1977), even though it predated by a few years the distribution and use of the contraceptive pill (merely not necessarily its appearance; Caldwell, 2001). Co-ordinate to Leridon (1987), the babe bust was the combined result of a subtract in the desired number of children and more than constructive family planning. Van de Kaa and Lesthaghe (Lesthaghe, 1995; Lesthaghe and Van de Kaa, 1986; Van de Kaa, 1987) have proposed the concept of "second demographic transition" to describe the changes in the terminal third of the twentieth century that led to the decline in fertility. Co-ordinate to these authors, the emergence of an individualistic family model, in which the family unit is built upon the couple relationship, has affected both the family germination process (delayed marriage and greater propensity to divorce) and reproductive behaviour, with a pronounced decline in fertility. Coleman (2004), along with others, has contested this theory, challenge that the fertility downturn is simply a phase in the overall process of fertility transition that began at the plow of the twentieth century or even earlier.

32In the almost contempo cohorts (women born in and after the 1950s), fertility reached very low levels, characterized by strong polarization around two-children families and a smaller per centum of large families with iv or more children. However, even if the very low levels of fertility observed since the late 1970s and especially in the 1980s are one of the characteristic features of the "second demographic transition", current fertility levels are not infrequent and are similar to those observed before the baby blast (Brée et al., 2017). The predominance of two-children families is, conversely, specific to the women born since the 1940s. However, Frejka (2008) suggests that this predominance may be challenged by a possible futurity increase in childless and one-child families. In French republic, childlessness remains at adequately low levels compared with other European countries, only one-child families are quite mutual and their per centum has remained relatively stable since the cohorts born in the 1940s. This stability is remarkable given that the expected bear upon of the increase in the female parent's historic period at first birth and the higher frequency of separation among couples with one kid would be to enhance the probability of having simply ane child (Breton and Prioux, 2009).

Never-married women

33While there are relatively few never-married women in the cohorts studied (7-12%), their fertility behaviour warrants analysis, especially as their proportion has increased in the near recent cohorts, and hence the share of their births in overall fertility. [xix]

34While the women born before the First World War had very few children out of wedlock – illegitimacy was still socially stigmatized (Fauve-Chamoux and Brunet, 2014) – behaviours changed after the 2d Earth War. A growing proportion of never-married women born in the belatedly 1920s and early on 1930s had at least 1 kid (Figure iv), and the miracle amplified in the subsequent cohorts. While explanations for the babe smash frequently revolve around the increase in legitimate fertility and age at matrimony (Van Bavel and Reher, 2013), information technology appears that never-married women also contributed to the increment in fertility, at least in France.

Figure 4

Parity distribution of never-married women at age 45, past cohort^*

Parity distribution of never-married women at historic period 45, by cohort^*

* The hateful historic period at childbirth was 28 years for the oldest cohorts, and 27 years for the more recent ones (INSEE, population estimates and civil records). For ease of interpretation, an average age of 28 was added to the birth cohorts to give an idea of the reproductive period.
Notation: For the oldest cohorts (up to the 1912-1916 accomplice), the distribution is the same because nosotros practical the distribution of the 1912-1916 cohort to them. Even if the shift in the distribution between the 1855 and 1910 cohorts is probably not every bit constant, the express change observed betwixt the 1912-1916 and 1922-1926 cohorts seems to validate our methodological choice.

35Starting in the 1970s, with the increase in cohabitation before matrimony (Roussel, 1978) and non-marital unions (Guibert-Lantoine et al., 1994; Rault and Régnier-Loilier, 2015) spousal relationship was no longer a pre-requisite for family formation. Extra-marital births became more common (Muñoz-Perez and Prioux, 1999) fifty-fifty if childbearing was generally preceded by marriage. By 2007, withal, the percentage of children born outside marriage exceeded that of children born to married couples (INSEE, ceremonious records). Among never-married women, a big number have nevertheless been in a relationship, have lived with a partner and even officialized their wedlock (through a ceremonious partnership, introduced in 1999; Rault and Régnier-Loilier, 2015), simply never-married women have always had fewer children than their ever-married counterparts. In the cohorts born in 1962-1966, a much higher percentage of never-married women are childless than ever-married women (twoscore% versus half dozen%). However, among women who have had at least ane child, the behaviours are much more similar. Never-married mothers more frequently have only i child than e'er-married mothers (39% versus 19%), but they almost as ofttimes have two children (40% versus 44%).

36These differences in fertility can be attributed to the fact that some never-married women do not accept a partner, or at to the lowest degree not during their reproductive years, but also to the fact that women who practice not want children are much less probable to ally than those who do.

All women

37The family sizes of all women (Figure 5) closely lucifer those of ever-married women, since the latter represent the overwhelming bulk (88% to 93%) of women. The chief variations are observed for parities 0 and 1, since these are the parities most affected by the behaviour of never-married women. The changes in completed fertility announced to be determined by large families, even more so than for married women alone.

38Childlessness should therefore always be analysed with care, since levels vary strongly depending on whether all women or only ever-married women are taken into account. In France, childlessness among women built-in in 1892-1896 was 26.9% for all women and eighteen.8% for e'er-married women.

39Analysing the fertility of ever-married women only might announced to be a more rigorous arroyo (because the information are better and the indicator more robust since ever-married women are, in principle, all exposed to the risk of pregnancy). For the near contempo cohorts, nevertheless, information technology is important to measure out overall fertility, since at that place is no longer a stardom between marital and non-marital births.

Figure v

Parity distribution of all women, by accomplice (1850-1966)^*

Parity distribution of all women, by cohort (1850-1966)^*

* The mean age at childbirth was 28 years for the oldest cohorts, and 27 years for the more contempo ones (INSEE, population estimates and civil records). For ease of interpretation, an boilerplate age of 28 was added to the birth cohorts to give an idea of the reproductive period.

2 – Parity progression ratios

40In addition to family size, which indicates how many women have had exactly one kid, ii children, and so forth, during their lifetimes, parity progression ratios measure the per centum of women who take increased their family size from 1 child to two, from 2 to three and so on (Effigy 6). For all childless women, the ratio a ₀ expresses the run a risk of having at to the lowest degree one birth (its complement to 1 (1 – a ₀) represents the risk of remaining childless). For all women who have had at least one kid, the probability a ₁ expresses the chance of having at to the lowest degree two children, and and then forth. This indicator is useful in that it shows how many women are mothers of at to the lowest degree one child, at least two children, etc., without taking subsequent births into business relationship. It is surprising to observe that while the probability of having a second child is the same in the cohorts born around 1960 every bit in those born a century before, there are twice as many families of two children in the about recent cohorts (39%) every bit in the cohorts born around 1860 (18%).

41We tin see immediately that parity progression ratios decreased across all cohorts of women born betwixt 1850 and 1891. The pattern changed for the cohorts between 1892 and 1911 who had their children during the interwar period, among whom the probability of having a first child increased. The probability of having a second child began to increase with the 1902-1906 accomplice and that of having a tertiary child with the following accomplice. Starting with the cohorts born in 1927-1931, the probability of having a first child and and so a second was higher than in the cohorts born in the mid-nineteenth century. Conversely, the probabilities of higher parities fell, indicating a shift in fertility behaviour which subsequently became increasingly dependent on the number of children already born, equally is characteristically the example under regimes of more than controlled fertility (Festy, 1979). Lastly, starting with the women born in the 1950s, who began having children in the early 1980s, behaviours have tended to stabilize: 87% of these women have at least 1 child, and they had the highest probability of having a 2nd child (78%). By contrast, very few take more than than two children: the probabilities of having a third child (a ₂ = 44%) or more than iii (a _three = 33%) has dropped sharply. The stabilization of the parity progression ratios a ₂ and a ₃ in the cohorts built-in subsequently the Second Earth War may indicate a polarization issue, with some women nonetheless having large families. Large families are less common than in the previous cohorts but probably reflect a selection not to limit family size. This may be a consequence of international clearing and the permanent settlement in French republic of communities with higher fertility than the French average (Masson, 2013).

Figure vi

Parity progression ratios of all women born between 1850 and 1966^*

Parity progression ratios of all women born between 1850 and 1966^*

* The hateful historic period at childbirth was 28 years for the oldest cohorts, and 27 years for the more recent ones (INSEE, population estimates and civil records). For ease of interpretation, an average historic period of 28 was added to the nascency cohorts to give an idea of the reproductive period.
Fable: In the 1892-1896 birth cohorts, the probability of having a first child was 73% (a ₀), that of having a 2d child 68% (a _ane) then forth.
Notation: The parity progression ratios for the cohorts born after 1962 are for reference only.

42Although the preceding comments are besides valid for ever-married women (Appendix Figure A.six), the parity progression ratios of never-married women follow quite a different pattern (Figure 7). Firstly, the probability of having a (kickoff) child increased from 17% to 60% between the never-married women born in the early 1920s and those born in the late 1960s. Even more than chiefly, the probability of having a 2nd child increased steadily between those cohorts, to the extent that never-married women born in the 1960s and mothers of one child take almost all had a second child. However, just 35% take a third child and, of that group, but the aforementioned percentage have a quaternary child. While never-married women are still much less likely to have a outset and a second child than ever-married women, their behaviours are nevertheless moving closer to those of ever-married women, in detail for those who already have two children. Never-married women who already have three children are just as probable to have a fourth child equally ever-married mothers of 3 children.

Figure 7

Parity progression ratios of never-married women born between 1850 and 1966^*

Parity progression ratios of never-married women born between 1850 and 1966^*

* The hateful age at childbirth was 28 years for the oldest cohorts, and 27 years for the more contempo ones (INSEE, population estimates and civil records). For ease of estimation, an average age of 28 was added to the birth cohorts to give an thought of the reproductive catamenia.

Conclusion

43Despite the difficulties stemming from the variety of available sources and the heterogeneity of results, information technology is nevertheless possible to assess trends in the lifetime parity distribution of women born between 1850 and 1966. This historical analysis of parities and parity progress ratios refines the conclusions drawn from averages (completed fertility) and shows that parity distributions should always be taken into account when analysing fertility (Anderson, 1998). Information technology provides a articulate picture of the considerable decline in big families (four or more children) among the cohorts born betwixt 1850 and 1900, the high prevalence of childlessness and one-child families in the cohorts who had their children in the interwar menstruation, and the abrupt increment in families of 2 children starting with the cohorts born in the 1920s. Consideration of family size is therefore of import for fertility analysis considering it shows that for the same completed fertility, the parity distribution may vary substantially, revealing different conceptions of family. Information technology has particular value for the historical analysis of the family and of the place of children and women in guild. Longitudinal inquiry is besides essential for understanding recent fertility trends and putting them into perspective. Indeed, while current fertility levels are low, they are not exceptional on the scale of a century of cohort fertility, and the fertility of the most recent cohorts is characterized less by low fertility than past the loftier prevalence of 2-children families.

44Lastly, this enquiry highlights the importance of distinguishing between the fertility of all women, of ever-married women and of never-married women, particularly for the assay of childlessness and low fertility (one kid). This differentiation confirms the overwhelming touch of the fertility of e'er-married women until the cohorts born in the 1920s and the subsequent affect on fertility of new union germination preferences.

45The renewal of interest in fertility in the twentieth century [20] reflects the continuing quest to empathise the end of the demographic transition (Brée et al., 2016a, 2016c; Breschi et al., 2016), the baby boom (Duvoisin et al., 2016; Gauvreau and Laplante, 2016) and the baby bust (Nomès and Van Bavel, 2016). Retrospective analysis of family sizes by educational level or religion, or in relation to matrimony patterns, offers new elements for agreement changes in fertility. Besides, analysis at the sub-national level makes it possible to explore the heterogeneity of behaviours in more particular, as recommended past Van Bavel and Reher (2013). The contribution of qualitative approaches (Bonvalet et al., 2011; Rebreyend, 2003; Rusterholz, 2015, 2017; Sohn, 1996) is also increasing. Clearly, a combination of these methods is needed in order to sympathise fertility in the twentieth century and up to the present solar day.

Appendices

Table A.1

Parity distribution (%) and completed fertility

Parity distribution (%) and completed fertility

Figure A.1

Distribution of the number of women aged 45 at nigh at the fourth dimension of the survey, by five-year accomplice

Distribution of the number of women aged 45 at most at the time of the survey, by five-year accomplice

Figure A.2

Parity distribution of never-married women (1912-1916 to 1962-1966 cohorts)

Parity distribution of never-married women (1912-1916 to 1962-1966 cohorts)

Figure A.3

Parity distribution of all women

Parity distribution of all women

Note: The results of the 1931 and 1946 censuses are provided for reference only because they were calculated on the assumption that all never-married women were childless (which explains the much bigger differences for 0 and 1 child than for the other parities).

Figure A.iv

Completed fertility of the cohorts according to different estimates

Completed fertility of the cohorts co-ordinate to unlike estimates

Interpretation: "If never-married women all had at least one child": 90% with one child, 5% with 2 children, 3% with three children and 2% with four or more children.

Effigy A.5

Simulation of completed fertility and parities for ever-married women without the increase in big families between the 1897-1901 and 1942-1946 cohorts^*

Simulation of completed fertility and parities for always-married women without the increase in large families betwixt the 1897-1901 and 1942-1946 cohorts^*

* The mean age at childbirth was 28 years for the oldest cohorts, and 27 years for the more recent ones (INSEE, population estimates and civil records). For ease of interpretation, an average age of 28 was added to the birth cohorts to give an idea of the reproductive period.
Note: This estimate produces a linear subtract in the per centum of large families from 13.25% for the 1937-1941 cohorts to 11.89% for the 1947-1951 cohorts, which completely wipes out the increment observed between those two groups of cohorts. The remaining share is distributed across the other parities according to the really observed distribution.

Figure A.vi

Parity progression ratios for ever-married women built-in betwixt 1850 and 1966^*

Parity progression ratios for always-married women born between 1850 and 1966^*

* The mean age at childbirth was 28 years for the oldest cohorts, and 27 years for the more recent ones (INSEE, population estimates and civil records). For ease of interpretation, an average age of 28 was added to the nascence cohorts to requite an idea of the reproductive catamenia.
Note: The parity progression ratios for the cohorts born after 1962 are for reference only (source: Famille et logements, 2011).

Statistical sources

46Enquête Famille (Family unit survey), 1954, INSEE, ADISP-CMH. Enquête Famille (Family survey), 1975, INSEE, ADISP-CMH. Enquête Famille (Family survey), 1982, INSEE, ADISP-CMH. Enquête Famille (Family survey), 1990, INSEE, ADISP-CMH.

47Étude de l'histoire familiale (Family unit history survey), 1999, INSEE, ADISP-CMH.

48Enquête Famille et logements (Family and housing survey), 2011, INSEE, ADISP-CMH.

49French population census, 1931.

50French population census, 1946, INSEE, Statistique générale de la France.

Notes

• [*]

  Heart for Demographic Inquiry, Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium.
  Correspondence: Sandra Brée, Centre de recherche en démographie, Université catholique de Louvain, one place Montesquieu, B1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Kingdom of belgium, email: sandra.bree@uclouvain.exist

• [1]

  Patrick Festy'south vast study (1979) of fertility in Western countries between 1870 and 1970 was based on a diagonal reading of five-year age-specific fertility rates collected by Pierre Depoid (1941) to judge the fertility of French cohorts, a method that Fabienne Daguet (2002) also practical to the data from INED's study on the demographic situation of France in 1974 (INED, 1976).

• [2]

  Reproductive life is more often than not measured between the ages of 15 and 50. It was limited hither to age 45 (also commonly used) so that another five-year accomplice could be included in the analysis with near no bear upon on the results (because very few children are built-in to women aged 45-l).

• [iii]

  The question "How many children do you have?" is asked in the censuses starting in 1886 but only provides information about surviving children, not all live-born children, which can create a considerable bias (for Paris, encounter Brée, 2011, 2017). For a history of family statistics, encounter the first chapter on family statistics from the 1946 French population census (INSEE, 1946, pp. Eight-XII).

• [4]

  The sample size per accomplice for the different surveys is presented in Appendix Figure A.1.

• [5]

  The 1962 survey, considered to be biased, is no longer distributed past INSEE.

• [half-dozen]

  It was Louis Henry who recommended remaining "at the national level" [with no more than] a broad classification into major occupational or […] socioeconomic groups" (Henry, 1953, p. 490).

• [7]

  The Family survey was compulsory until 1990. In 1999, given the largely retrospective nature of the survey, its designers dropped this requirement (Héran, 2005). This change probably explains the significant deviation between the non-response rates in the 1982 and 1990 surveys and the more contempo 1999 and 2011 surveys.

• [8]

  For the 1999 and 2011 surveys, the weightings proposed by the survey designers were used (poidsm5 for the 1999 survey and poids_ind for the 2011 survey).

• [nine]

  The average of 1902-1906 and 1912-1916 was used for the accomplice of 1907-1911.

• [10]

  Illegitimate births were slightly more than frequent in the cohorts built-in between 1860 and 1890 (roughly nine% co-ordinate to Nizard and Maksud, 1977) than in the afterward cohorts (7% for the cohorts born around 1900; 8% for those born in the 1920s; source: INSEE, ceremonious registration).

• [eleven]

  We chose to utilize the levels of permanent celibacy from the population censuses (INSEE) rather than from the surveys (which, according to Toulemon, 1996, are underestimated). For the cohorts from 1850 to 1922-1926, the level used is that published in Chasteland and Pressat (1962).

• [12]

  The accomplice fertility of all women cannot exist estimated from the 1931 and 1946 censuses because only married, widowed or divorced women were surveyed, which explains why this method was chosen.

• [13]

  The method consists in summing the age-specific rates for the same cohort (eastward.g. for the cohort born in 1930, the fertility charge per unit at historic period 20 in 1950 is added to the fertility charge per unit at age 21 in 1951, and then along).

• [14]

  The issue of how stillborn children are counted is irrelevant here because the question is but asked in relation to live-born children.

• [15]

  In both cohorts, one-3rd of women were mothers of three or more than children.

• [sixteen]

  On the links between fertility and crises, come across Eggerickx et al. (2016).

• [17]

  Acts of 1920 prohibiting the advertisement and sale of contraceptive methods, and the Deed of 1923 that downgraded ballgame from a offense to a misdemeanour, with a lighter penalisation.

• [18]

  Female parent'due south Day and family unit allowance in 1932 (the latter was made universal in 1939).

• [19]

  On the contribution of illegitimate fertility to overall fertility in the nineteenth century, see Brée (2014).

• [20]

  See, for case, result 2016-2 of Les Annales de démographie historique.

Through a longitudinal analysis of parities and parity progression ratios, this article charts the fertility of the cohorts of women born in France betwixt 1850 and 1966. After reviewing the available sources and data (population censuses and family surveys), and the methods used for retrospective accomplice analysis of fertility, the author proposes estimates of changing family sizes over more than a century. The simultaneous report of trends in family size and completed fertility enhances our agreement of fertility trends, and more specifically the touch of changes in each family unit size on overall fertility patterns. This refines the conclusions that tin be drawn from an interpretation of averages (completed fertility) by showing that, for the aforementioned completed fertility, the parity distribution can be highly variable, and demonstrates that family size should e'er be taken into account when analysing fertility. This research also highlights the value of differentiating betwixt the fertility of all women, of ever-married women and of never-married women, peculiarly when analysing childlessness and depression fertility (one child).

Keywords

• fertility
• cohorts
• France
• longitudinal assay
• retrospective analysis
• historical demography

Français

Évolution de la taille des familles au fil des générations en France (1850-1966)

À travers l'analyse longitudinale des parités et des probabilités d'agrandissement, cet article retrace 50'évolution de la fécondité des générations féminines en French republic nées entre 1850 et 1966. Après avoir présenté les sources et données disponibles (recensements de population et enquêtes Famille), et les méthodes utilisées pour fifty'analyse rétrospective de la fécondité des générations, fifty'auteure propose des estimations de l'évolution de la taille des familles sur plus d'un siècle. 50'étude de 50'évolution conjointe de la taille des familles et de la descendance finale améliore la compréhension des tendances de la fécondité, et plus particulièrement le poids de 50'évolution de chaque taille de famille dans fifty'évolution générale de la fécondité. Elle nuance ainsi les conclusions que 50'on pourrait tirer de la lecture des simples moyennes (descendances finales) en montrant qu'à descendance finale égale, la distribution des parités peut être très variable, et encourage à toujours prendre en compte la composition des familles dans l'analyse de la fécondité. Cette recherche souligne également l'intérêt de la différenciation de la fécondité de l'ensemble des femmes, des femmes ayant été mariées et des femmes célibataires, notamment dans 50'analyse de l'infécondité et des basses fécondités (1 enfant).

Español

Evolución del tamaño de las familias a lo largo de las generaciones en Francia (1850-1966)

Conjugando el análisis longitudinal de las paridades y de las probabilidades de crecimiento de las familias, este artículo sigue la evolución de la fecundidad de las generaciones femeninas en Francia, nacidas entre 1850 y 1966. Después de presentar las fuentes y los datos disponibles (censos de la población y encuestas Famille), así como los métodos utilizados para el análisis retrospectivo de la fecundidad, la autora propone estimaciones de la evolución del tamaño de las familias durante más de united nations siglo. El estudio conjunta del tamaño de las familias y de la descendencia last mejora la comprensión de las tendencias de la fecundidad, y en especial el papel que ha jugado cada tamaño de familia en la evolución general de la fecundidad. Se matizan así las conclusiones que se podrían sacar de la simple lectura de las descendencias finales, y se muestra que para una misma descendencia final la distribución según el tamaño de las familias puede ser muy variable. Lo cual incita a tener siempre en cuenta la composición de las familias en el análisis de la fecundidad. En el artículo se subraya igualmente el interés de distinguir la fecundidad del conjunto de las mujeres, la de las mujeres casadas y la de las mujeres solteras, sobre todo en el análisis de la infecundidad y de la baja fecundidad (un hijo).

1. I - Sources and method used to measure family size
2. 1. 1 - What data are bachelor?
   2. two - Measuring completed fertility and family size by women's marital status
3. II - Changing family size in cohorts born betwixt 1850 and 1966
4. 1. ane - Trends in family size
   2. 1. Always-married women
      2. Never-married women
      3. All women
   3. 2 - Parity progression ratios
5. Determination

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Sandra Brée[*]

• [*]

  Centre for Demographic Inquiry, Université catholique de Louvain, Kingdom of belgium.
  Correspondence: Sandra Brée, Center de recherche en démographie, Université catholique de Louvain, 1 identify Montesquieu, B1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, email: sandra.bree@uclouvain.be

Translated past

Madeleine Grieve

• Introduction
• Separation and divorce in European societies from the seventeenth century to the early on twentieth century
• Avec Guy Brunet
• In Annales de démographie historique Book 140, Issue 2, July 2020

This periodical welcomes original contributions from researchers in demography and associated disciplines. Read more...

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